Jerusalem, November 24, 2025 – In a landmark move marking the first formal accountability for the deadliest attack in Israel's history, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the dismissal of three senior generals and disciplinary measures against numerous other high-ranking officers on Sunday. The actions stem directly from the military's failure to prevent the Hamas-led assault on October 7, 2023, which claimed the lives of 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and saw over 250 individuals taken hostage into Gaza. This unprecedented internal reckoning comes amid a fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire in Gaza, now in its second month, and intense public demands for broader governmental scrutiny of the catastrophe that ignited a devastating two-year war.
The dismissed officers include three divisional commanders: the former head of the IDF's Intelligence Directorate, Aharon Haliva; the former head of the Operations Directorate, Oded Basyuk; and Gen. Yaron Finkelman, who led the Southern Command responsible for Gaza border security at the time. In a stark military statement released late Sunday, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir emphasized that these leaders "bear personal responsibility for the armed forces’ failure to prevent the attack launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip." Notably, all three had already tendered their resignations earlier in the year but remained on reserve duty until this formal release, which effectively ends their military careers.
Disciplinary sanctions extend far beyond these firings, encompassing a wide swath of the command structure. The heads of the Navy and Air Force—Adm. David Saar Salama and Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, respectively—face formal reprimands for lapses in aerial and maritime defense against Hamas's paragliders, drones, and rocket barrages during the initial onslaught. Additionally, four other major generals and at least a dozen senior officers across intelligence, operations, and regional commands will undergo administrative penalties, including demotions, mandatory retraining, or suspension from promotions for up to five years. Zamir described these measures as essential to "sharpen the meaning of responsibility" and rebuild public trust in the IDF, which he acknowledged had "eroded" since the attack.
This cascade of accountability follows the release of a damning 150-page report by an expert committee, chaired by retired Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman, appointed by Zamir in March 2025 to review the IDF's internal probes into the October 7 failures. The panel, comprising former IDF chiefs and intelligence veterans, concluded its work after five months of exhaustive analysis, deeming most prior investigations "inadequate" or "unacceptable" for their narrow scope and lack of interagency coordination. Presented to IDF brass on November 10, the report identifies a "long-standing systemic and organizational failure" that permeated the military apparatus for years, exacerbated by flawed threat assessments and cultural complacency.
At the heart of the critique is a profound intelligence failure. Despite possessing exceptional, high-quality information on Hamas's buildup—including detailed plans codenamed "Jericho Wall" for breaching the Gaza border fence—the IDF failed to raise the alarm or adjust its posture. The report reveals that by mid-2023, Israeli signals intelligence had intercepted Hamas communications indicating preparations for a large-scale offensive during a Jewish holiday, yet these were dismissed as bluffs amid a broader misperception that Hamas sought economic stability over confrontation. On the eve of the attack, October 6, 2023, indicators such as unusual Hamas drills and radio silence should have triggered heightened alerts, but no such escalation occurred, leaving border units understaffed and unprepared.
The inquiry further lambasts deficient decision-making processes and force deployment during the night of October 7, 2023, exposing a chain-of-command collapse that allowed Hamas militants to overrun 22 communities and military outposts within hours. The Gaza Division, tasked with border defense, was overrun within hours, with commanders losing situational awareness amid delayed reinforcements and inadequate firepower. This echoed the surprise of the 1973 Yom Kippur War but on a more devastating scale, as paragliders and bulldozers tore through fortifications unchallenged for critical early hours. The panel attributes these breakdowns to a decade-long drift: over-reliance on technology, underinvestment in ground forces, and a flawed organizational culture that prioritized multi-front threats like Hezbollah over Gaza.
The report's release caps a series of internal IDF probes initiated under former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, who resigned in June 2025 partly over his own accountability for the lapses. Zamir, who assumed the role in March, vowed upon appointment to pursue personal decisions on senior officers, a promise now fulfilled. Yet, the actions stop short of criminal charges, focusing instead on administrative reforms. Recommendations include overhauling intelligence warning protocols, mandating annual "red team" exercises to challenge assumptions, and integrating civilian-police coordination in regional defenses. Zamir has ordered these changes implemented by mid-2026, with quarterly progress audits.
This internal purge unfolds against a backdrop of political friction. The dismissals follow Zamir's public call on November 10 for a systemic investigation encompassing inter-agency interfaces—a plea issued just two weeks prior amid stalled government efforts. For over two years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition has resisted establishing a state commission of inquiry, arguing it would distract from ongoing security threats and the Gaza war. Netanyahu has insisted probes be deferred until after hostilities end, a stance that fueled massive protests in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, where polls show 70% of Israelis—spanning left and right—demand an independent panel akin to those after past national traumas.
Defense Minister Israel Katz, a Netanyahu ally, responded Monday by tasking the defense comptroller, Yair Wolansky, with reviewing Zamir's report within 30 days to assess needs for further probes. This move hints at escalating tensions between Katz and Zamir, who have clashed over war strategy, including IDF restraint under the ceasefire. Critics, including opposition leader Yair Lapid, hailed the firings as a vital first step but decried the lack of civilian oversight, warning that without it, the full truth of October 7 remains buried.
The October 7 assault remains a scar on Israel's psyche. Hamas, bolstered by Iranian support, executed a meticulously planned operation involving 3,000 fighters who infiltrated via land, sea, and air, massacring families in kibbutzim like Be'eri and Kfar Aza, and storming the Nova music festival, where 364 revelers perished. The ensuing war has killed nearly 70,000 Palestinians in Gaza, per health ministry figures deemed reliable by the UN, displacing 90% of the enclave's population and drawing global condemnation for humanitarian crises. Ceasefire talks, mediated by the U.S., Qatar, and Egypt, have released 150 hostages in phases but falter on Hamas demands for full withdrawal and Israeli vows to dismantle the group.
As Israel commemorates the attack's second anniversary this week with memorials and vows of "never again," Zamir's reforms signal a military in flux. "From the pain of that day, we will forge resilience," he stated, underscoring lessons for a nation still at war's edge. Yet, with Gaza's truce holding tenuously amid accusations of violations—such as Israeli tank fire killing one civilian in Gaza City on Sunday—the specter of renewed conflict looms. For bereaved families and survivors, these dismissals offer partial closure, but the quest for unvarnished truth persists, a national imperative in an era of existential threats.
