In a series of swift presidential decrees broadcast on state-owned South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) on November 17, 2025, President Salva Kiir Mayardit executed one of his most extensive government overhauls in recent months, dismissing four cabinet ministers, a state governor, and the inspector general of police while reinstating key allies to top positions. The moves, which come just weeks after the abrupt ouster of Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, underscore Kiir's ongoing strategy to tighten control over South Sudan's fractured political landscape, even as the country teeters on the edge of renewed conflict under the strained 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
The reshuffle, announced without any official explanations—a hallmark of Kiir's decrees—has sparked widespread speculation about internal rivalries within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the broader implications for the unity government. Analysts suggest it reflects not only efforts to address economic stagnation and security lapses but also preemptive maneuvering ahead of delayed national elections slated for December 2026. With South Sudan's economy crippled by hyperinflation, oil revenue disputes with Sudan, and persistent intercommunal violence, these changes could either stabilize or further destabilize the world's youngest nation, which has endured near-constant turmoil since gaining independence in 2011.
Key Appointments and Dismissals: A Return to Familiar Faces
The centerpiece of the reshuffle was the reinstatement of James Wani Igga, a veteran SPLM stalwart and longtime ally of Kiir, as vice president in charge of the Economic Cluster and first deputy chairman of the SPLM. Igga, who first assumed the vice presidency in 2013 following the outbreak of civil war, was unceremoniously dismissed in February 2025 and reassigned as SPLM secretary-general. His rapid return, succeeding Bol Mel—who was sacked on November 12 amid rumors of "premature presidential ambitions"—marks a reversal of fortune for the 72-year-old politician. Bol Mel, a sanctioned businessman elevated to vice president just nine months prior, had been stripped of his four-star general rank and removed from the National Security Service in a move that analysts described as a purge of potential successors. Igga's reappointment is seen as an attempt to restore stability to the economic portfolio, which oversees South Sudan's vital oil sector—responsible for over 90% of government revenue—but has been plagued by corruption allegations and production shortfalls due to pipeline disruptions in Sudan.
Complementing Igga's elevation, Kiir targeted several high-profile ministries in a bid to refresh leadership amid public discontent over service delivery. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Joseph Geng Akech was relieved and replaced by Michael Makuei Lueth, the outspoken former minister of information, communication, technology, and postal services. Makuei, known for his combative media style and close ties to Kiir, steps into a role critical for upholding the R-ARCSS, especially as constitutional reforms and election preparations remain stalled. Just one decree later, Kiir dismissed Makuei from his information ministry post and appointed Ateny Wek Ateny, Kiir's former press secretary, as the new minister and government spokesperson. Ateny's promotion is expected to centralize narrative control, particularly in countering opposition critiques amplified on social media and international platforms.
Infrastructure and environmental portfolios also saw upheaval. Simon Mijok Mijak, minister of roads and bridges, was ousted and succeeded by Peter Lam Both, a former SPLM secretary-general who himself faced dismissal earlier in 2025. South Sudan's dilapidated road network, exacerbated by annual flooding and conflict-related sabotage, has hampered trade and humanitarian aid, making this swap urgent. Similarly, Josephine Naphon was removed as minister of environment and forestry, with Mabior Garang de Mabior, son of SPLM founder John Garang, appointed in her place. Mabior's entry into cabinet—his first major role since defecting from the opposition in 2020—serves as a symbolic nod to SPLM's liberation-era roots, potentially appeasing historical factions while addressing deforestation and climate vulnerabilities that displace thousands yearly.
On the security front, General Abraham Manyuat, inspector general of the National Police Service since December 2024, was dismissed and replaced by General Saeed Chawul Lom, who previously held the post from 2017 to 2018. This change comes amid rising urban crime in Juba and intercommunal clashes in rural areas, where police have struggled to maintain order without army intervention. At the state level, Central Equatoria Governor Rubi Mujung, appointed in June 2025, was replaced by Emmanuel Adil Anthony, a move that reshapes leadership in the politically sensitive region encompassing the capital. Central Equatoria has been a flashpoint for ethnic tensions and opposition activity, making Adil's appointment—a returnee from a prior term—a bid for loyalty enforcement.
Historical Context: From Independence to Endless Instability
These dismissals are not isolated; they form part of a pattern where Kiir has sacked over 37 senior officials in under a year, including two vice presidents, a chief justice, and multiple army generals. The 2018 R-ARCSS grants Kiir broad authority to appoint and dismiss national and state officials unilaterally, provided he consults opposition leaders for non-SPLM figures—a clause often honored in the breach. This power stems from the peace deal that ended the 2013–2018 civil war, a cataclysmic conflict ignited when Kiir accused then-Vice President Riek Machar of plotting a coup on December 15, 2013. What began as a political rift between the Dinka-led government and Nuer-dominated opposition rapidly devolved into ethnic massacres, famine, and atrocities, claiming nearly 400,000 lives and displacing over four million.
An initial 2015 peace accord collapsed in 2016 amid renewed fighting in Juba, forcing Machar into exile. The 2018 revitalization, mediated by regional powers including Sudan and Uganda, established a power-sharing unity government with Machar as first vice president. Yet implementation has faltered: security sector reforms lag, with unified forces still divided along ethnic lines; elections have been postponed twice; and economic chapters remain unfulfilled amid oil block disputes.
Tensions escalated dramatically in March 2025 when Machar was placed under house arrest at his Juba residence by government forces. The arrest followed clashes in Nasir, Upper Nile State, where the Nuer-aligned White Army militia overran a government garrison, killing around 250 soldiers. Machar, his wife Angelina Teny, and bodyguards were disarmed and confined on charges of treason, murder, and crimes against humanity—allegations his Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) decries as a "political witch-hunt" to dismantle the peace deal. SPLM-IO deputy leader Oyet Nathaniel Pierino warned that the detention "effectively brings the agreement to a collapse," jeopardizing peace for millions.
Machar's September 2025 trial, broadcast live on state TV but initially barring private media, has fueled protests in Nuer strongholds like Bentiu, where demonstrators decried it as tribal persecution. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has expressed alarm, noting the arrest signals a "severe unravelling" of the peace process, with risks of widespread civilian attacks. Regional actors, including Kenyan President William Ruto, have dispatched envoys to mediate, but fears of relapse into full-scale war persist, especially as SPLM-IO calls for "regime change."
Broader Implications: Economic Woes, Security Risks, and Succession Shadows
Kiir's reshuffle arrives against a backdrop of acute humanitarian crisis. Over 7.7 million South Sudanese—more than half the population—face acute food insecurity, worsened by floods displacing 900,000 and conflict blocking aid corridors. The finance ministry, reshuffled just weeks ago with Athian Diing Athian's dismissal on November 4, exemplifies the churn: South Sudan has cycled through eight finance ministers since 2020, amid accusations of graft siphoning oil funds. Igga's economic oversight may prioritize revenue stabilization, but without Machar's input, power-sharing feels illusory.
Security remains precarious. Recent White Army skirmishes echo 2013's ethnic fault lines, with Nuer-Dinka clashes in Jonglei and Upper Nile claiming hundreds. Reinstating Lom as police chief could bolster urban policing, but analysts doubt it addresses root causes like command fragmentation in the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF). At the state level, Adil's appointment in Central Equatoria aims to curb militia activity near Juba, yet opposition voices warn of backlash if perceived as Dinka favoritism.
Succession looms large. Bol Mel's fall, after being tipped as Kiir's heir, highlights the 74-year-old president's wariness of rivals. Igga's reinstatement and Mabior Garang's cabinet debut suggest a pivot to generational bridging, invoking John Garang's legacy to unify SPLM factions. Yet, with Machar's trial ongoing and SPLM-IO sidelined, the reshuffle risks alienating opposition holdouts, potentially fracturing the coalition further.
Civil society groups like the South Sudan Civil Society Forum urge dialogue, emphasizing that "decrees alone cannot build peace." International partners, including the US and EU, have called for Machar's release and inclusive reforms, warning that renewed war could displace millions more and destabilize the Horn of Africa. As Kiir's decree book thickens—now a "manual of governance" per critics—the path forward hinges on whether this reshuffle fosters accountability or entrenches division.
In Juba's sweltering heat, where billboards tout unity amid checkpoints bristling with soldiers, South Sudanese await clarity. For now, the decrees echo a familiar refrain: change from above, but peace from below remains elusive.
